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Susantha Goonatilake's article points up, I suppose, the dangers of
trying to attract attention with jazzy labels like 'late development
effect' which are given more attention than the ideas that underlie
them. First, then, a little clarification. When I wrote of a 'late
development effect' (IDS Communication no. 103) I used it as a label
for propositions of the kind: ('the later in world history that a
deliberate development drive starts, the more .
.
.) I suggested several
dependent clauses;. . . the more the State is involved in the economy
(the Gerschenkron insight which set me off on that track);. . . the more
educational qualifications are used to allocate jobs;. . . the more
unlikely a country is to develop wage and industrial relations systems
like Britain's. Note that the mechanisms do not only involve the one on
which Susantha Goonatilake concentrates - direct cultural borrowing.
Much depends also on other factors like the increasing interdependence
of national economies, the increasing technical possibilities of mortality
control and growing population increase rates, increasing technical
possibilities of rapid and cheap communications, etc.
The particular hypotheses about a late developer's likely pattern of
employment relations I have set out elsewhere in this issue. There were
two kinds of hypotheses; one, clearly testable, about the sort of
institutional forms one was likely to find in the modern sector industry
of capitalist late-developers: low turnover of permanent workers, wage
and promotion systems that provide workers with some kind of steady
career progression, a good deal of enterprise welfare, an enterprise-unit
basis of trade union organization and collective bargaining etc. When
Susantha Goonatilake writes up the results of the research we did in Sri
Lanka, I think the answer will be that some features do not fit
expectations - notably I had underestimated the importance of the
state and legal processes but a very great many of them do.
The issue lies in the other set of hypotheses
- about why this should be
so. Perhaps, since I have clearly not made myself sufficiently
understood, I should say briefly what my assumptions actually were.
First, I assumed that a lot was to be explained by the common 'logic of
50
the situation' of late developing countries; the demographic situation,
the training needs for sophisicated imported technology; or the fact
that educational systems are built faster than modern industry - i.e.
not only by the transfer of social technology. Secondly, as for the
modes of such transfer, I assumed that there are crucial stages in the
history of a country's industrialization when employment institutions,
patterns of industrial relations, etc., take a definite shape, after which
change becomes more gradual - Japan had such a period in the 1920s
and again in the late 1940s; Sri Lanka, I suppose, in the late 1940s and
195 Os. The institutions thus built are likely to embody whatever is the
dominant received wisdom about the 'best' practices currently preached
in those of the early.starter countries which currently have the highest
prestige as being 'ahead'. Note that I say 'preached'; not practised. I
doubt if the Industrial Society in Bryanston Square would claim that
the latest wisdom which it purveys on its personnel management
courses for people from the Third World, represents current British
practice!
So, to deal with some of Susantha Goonatilake's points, I do not
assume that what is copied are early-starter average practices (his
perpetual leapfrog game scenario), I do not assume, bless him, that
England is the only source of the latest wisdom, and I do not assume
that the content of the transfer is fixed. I would have thought all this
was clear from those bits of me he quotes in his third paragraph and
third footnote.
Nor, to finish listing my non-assumptions, do I assume that imported
social technologies 'override the existing local one'. (I could hardly do
so - after all I have written in my book on Japanese and British
factories about the residual Japaneseness of Japanese institutions which
the circumstances of late development do not explain nor do I assume
that those elements of imported ideas which relate to the granting of
trade union and worker rights, are always 'peacefully' imported without
any of the prospective beneficiaries lifting a finger to get them. What I
would argue, however, is that the change in 'world norms' embodied in
ILO Conventions - as a result of the victories of trade union
movements in the early-starters - alters the nature of the struggle in the
late-starters. If one compares the fight of British trade unions over the
seventy years it took to move from the Combination Acts, which
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outlawed them, to the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, with the intensity
of that struggle in Sri Lanka, I would have thought it obvious that even
during the colonial period and certainly after Independence, Sri Lanka's
governments and capitalists were a push-over compared with the 19th
century British governments and capitalists.
But Susantha Goonatilake's main attack concentrates on my
assumption - which I freely admit - that most diffusion of social
technology and social ideas (I agree with him that they usually go
packaged together) goes from the richer 'advanced' early starters to the
'follower' poorer late-starters. I'm afraid I remain unmoved from this
assumption by his arguments about Maslow's interest in Buddhism or
the similarity (?) between flexitime and peasant time. And in any case
it is clearly in the last paragraph that his main objections are revealed. It
is not the empirical truth of the assumption that matters but the
consequences of acknowledging it. If, he suggests, people in Sri Lanka,
say, accept such a thesis as true they would be accepting cultural
domination as legitimate.
I would have thought the contrary was true. If historical analysis shows
a general tendency in late-developers to 'borrow the advanced country
latest', irrespective of its appropriateness, then I would have thought
that an awareness of this tendency is the best prophylactic against it.
One should be better able to pick and choose if one is armed with a
suitable general scepticism about 'the rich country latest' - whether
that be the latest labour-saving technology, the most fashionable
middle-class radicalism, or the new 'loosely structured' organizational
ideology to be found in the work of the impressive range of authors
whom Susantha cites. (I make, of course, no prejudgement as to
whether they are likely to be deemed appropriate or not).
As for the other side of the coin - whether for me to talk about these
mechanisms of cultural transmission amounts to imperialism; well, I
suppose that depends on one's definition of imperialism.
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